I view obligation much in the way that Kant wrote about: to act under an obligation is to act autonomously under self-written laws, not heteronomously under the demands of others or one’s own desires. Believing in Kant’s specific categorical imperatives is not necessary to holding this view of obligation. As long as one’s motive for an action stems primarily from a moral compass — be it utilitarianism, Kantianism, or something likely more amorphous — rather than some heteronomous wish (including legal and social norms typically classified as “obligations”), they are acting within this definition of obligation.
In Antigone, many different obligations dictate different choices. In the first scene, when Ismene and Antigone discuss whether to bury Polynices, an evident gap emerges between their obligations. Ismene refuses to even consider such a burial out of an obligation to Thebes and its laws. Meanwhile, Antigone is dead set on burial, which she derives from her obligation to both her brother and the gods and their prescribed rites. This highlights how even the most similar people — sharing the same blood and similar experiences — develop radically different obligations that prescribe radically different actions. The differences between the Nuremberg and Eichmann trials, tribunals with ostensibly the same purpose (holding Nazi criminals accountable), highlight this fact on a larger scale. The Allied prosecutors in Nuremberg primarily acted out of obligation to the global community to establish proper norms of international justice. On the other hand, the Israeli government leading the Eichmann trial focused mostly on anti-Semitism out of an obligation to their Jewish citizenry. This contrast in obligation explains the stark difference in ethos between the two trials.
The authenticity of an obligation only becomes clear when heteronomous interest and obligation are in conflict. For example, Creon’s “obligation” to Thebes as it pertains to punishing traitors like Polynices and Antigone quickly evaporates once Tiresias warns him of the consequences. His choice of power over a supposed obligation proves the obligation a farce. Meanwhile, Antigone’s staunch commitment to her obligation even in the face of death proves its legitimacy. Similarly, as Tammy Kernodle’s “‘I Wish I Knew How It Would Feel to Be Free’:Nina Simone and the Redefining of the Freedom Song of the 1960s”depicts, even as it became harmful to her career, “Simone remained committed to expressing the fight for equality and continued to perform her protest songs in live performances” (315). This shows a true obligation to racial justice which Simone maintains even when it is inconvenient to her personal interests.
Additionally, seeing as most people possess multiple obligations, conflict between those imperatives reveals its hierarchy. Initially, stuck between obligations to paternal loyalty and romantic love, Haemon underscores the primacy of his unwavering obedience to Creon even while advocating for sparing Antigone. This hierarchy of interests is evident in Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion in McGirt v. Oklahoma. Gorsuch is typically a staunch advocate for federalism, looking to delegate significant power from the federal government to their state counterparts. However, in McGirt, Gorsuch votes to refer the matter to federal court, because of his even stronger commitment to the “promise… on the far end of the Trail of Tears” to American Indians (1). Nevertheless, changing conditions can alter the hierarchy: incensed by Creon’s role in Antigone’s death, Haemon shifts his priorities in favor of avenging his lover as he attempts to kill his father.
Works Cited
Kernodle, Tammy L. “‘I wish I knew how it would feel to be free’: Nina Simone and the redefining of the Freedom Song of the 1960s.” Journal of the Society for American Music, vol. 2, no. 3, 18 July 2008, pp. 295–317.
Sophocles, et al. Antigone. Penguin Classics, 2000.
United States, Supreme Court. McGirt v. Oklahoma. Docket no. 18-9526, 9 July 2020.